Since its debut in the 18 th century, the P-value has been an integral part of hypothesis testing based scientific discoveries. As the statistical engine ages, questions are beginning to be raised, asking to what extent scientific discoveries based on a P-value (e.g., the practice of drawing scientific conclusions relying on the fact that the P-value is smaller than an artificially determined threshold, for example, that of 0.05) are reliable and reproducible, and the voice calling for adjusting the significance level of 0.05 or banning the P-value has been increasingly heard. Inspired by these questions, we inquire into the useful roles and misuses of the P-value in scientific studies. We attempt to unravel the associations between the P-value, sample size, significance level, and statistical power. For common misuses and misinterpretations of the Pvalue, we provide modest recommendations for practitioners. Additionally, we review, with a comparison, Bayesian alternatives to the P-value, and discuss the advantages of meta-analysis in combining information, reducing bias, and delivering reproducible evidence. Taken together, we argue that the P-value underpins a useful probabilistic decision-making system, provides evidence at a continuous scale, and allows for integrating results from multiple studies and data sets. But the interpretation must be contextual, taking into account the scientific question, experimental design (including the sample size and significance level), statistical power, effect size, and reproducibility. "Most statisticians are all too familiar with conversations [that] start: Q: What is the purpose of your analysis? A: I want to do a significance test. Q: No, I mean what is the overall objective? A (with puzzled look): I want to know if my results are significant. And so on...." [1].
And only by referring to and extracting from their views are we able to find arguments that complement ours and make this piece a relatively complete one.
We begin our journey with a brief historical account of the P-value and present its formal definition and real-world implementations. Next, we outline the roles the P-value plays in science and how it advances causal inference. Then, we present common misuses and misinterpretations of the P-value and offer modest recommendations for treating these issues. Using logical arguments and examples, we stress that the interpretation of the P-value must be contextual, taking into account the scientific question, experimental design (including the sample size and significance level), statistical power, effect size, and reproducibility. Additionally, we present the Bayesian alternative to the P-value and discuss a few advantages of performing meta-analysis to integrate information from multiple studies and data sets. We conclude with a discussion.
The Rise of the P-value
As with so much else that came to mould the discussion of hypothesis testing and the P-value, the origin of these concepts is difficult to trace. The earliest known hypothesis test was performed by John Arbuthnot. Having observed that the number of males born in London exceeded the number of females for 82 years (1629 -1710), Arbuthnot calculated that the probability of this happening was 0.5 82 [29] . Based on this small likelihood, Arbuthnot decided to reject, in modern terms, the (null) hypothesis that the birth rates for male and females are equal because the probability is so small (P = 0.5 82 ). This number is perhaps the first example of a P-value; namely the chance of observing the same phenomenon 82 years in a row, provided the birth rates are equal.
It is useful at this point to introduce the formal definition of the P-value. This will facilitate our discussion in later sections.
Fig. 1. A recap of the P-value and related concepts.
(a) Calculating the P-value. In the example outlined in (a), the P-value is the largest possible probability that the prevalence of the disease in the population was to be more than 20% (grey dot), under the null distribution (that the prevalence was 10%, indicated by the black dot). In other words, the P-value is the probability density over the shaded orange areas (and beyond). The probability density decreases from the center outwards (highest at the center) and the probability right of the shaded area is approaching zero (e.g., at the white dot). (b) Significance level (type I error), type II error, and power. The significance level (type I error or ) is a predetermined value (say 0.05) that quantifies the false positive rate. In other words, given that the null hypothesis were true, what is the probability of observing extreme values (red shades). The type II error (or ) quantifies the false negative rate. In other words, given that the alternative hypothesis were true, what is the probability of failing to reject the null hypothesis (blue shades). The power (or 1 − ) quantifies the true positive rate. In other words, given that the alternative hypothesis were true, what is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis (yellow shades). The true negative rate (or 1 − ) quantifies the probability of failing to reject the null hypothesis when it is true (represented by the white area -not completely shown -under the null hypothesis curve). (c) Roger Penrose's three-world system -the physical world, the Platonic mathematical world, and the mental world -and our modification of it. The physical world represents the entire universe (from every chemical element to every individual) and contains properties that are not readily accessible to the observer. These properties are governed by and can be explained using mathematical principles. The mathematical principles translate into (mental) understanding and form one's perspective about the physical world. (d) The triad of population, sample, and the P-value in making causal enquires. Consider an example where a clinician was inquiring into the prevalence of a disease in a specific age group (i.e., a specific population). Suppose the clinician considered a null hypothesis where the prevalence was 10% (in the population). Since measuring the prevalence of a disease in a population was impractical, the clinician selected a random sample of ten individuals from the population falling in that age group (see left arrow) and found that two had the disease (see top circle). The clinician then conducted a hypothesis test which generated a P-value of 0.26 (see right arrow; see text for calculation) and used this to make inference about the population (see bottom arrow). Given the P-value, the clinician concluded that there was not enough evidence (at a significance level of 0.05) from the sample that would reject the null hypothesis (made about the population).
Defining the P-value
A clinician was interested in estimating the prevalence of a disorder in a specific age group. Having no prior information about the disease, the clinician hypothesized that the prevalence was 10% in that age group. That is, the clinician hypothesized that the unobserved (population, or true) prevalence was at ! = 0.1 (see the black dot in Fig. 1 (a) ) with some variability. The outcome of an individual was recorded as " , where " was either 1 (diseased) or 0 (healthy), for = 1, 2, … ,10; hence the null assumed a binomial distribution with mean ! and variance ! (1 − ! ), that is, " ~ ( , ! ) where is the number of individuals and " denotes the random outcome of individual (see Fig. 1 (b) ). Under the clinician's (null) hypothesis, the probability of the prevalence in a random sample being of ! = was the highest for = 0.1 and decaying as x departed from the center (0.1) (as illustrated by the height of the curve). To test whether the hypothesis was correct or not, the clinician went on to select a random sample of ten individuals of the age group. Next, the clinician calculated the sample incidence of these ten individuals,
%! , and used this as the test statistic. Suppose out of the ten individuals, two had the disease, that is, ( ) = 0.2. Finally, the clinician tested how unlikely (or likely) the evidence from the sample would support the hypothesis ( ! = 0.1) -by calculating the P-value. In plain language, the P-value is the maximal probability (maximal is taken when there are a set of null hypotheses) that the sample incidence rate was going to be more than 0.2 under the null hypothesis (thus, the smaller the P-value, the less stronger an evidence from the sample with 20% incident rate supported the hypothesis of 10% prevalence). Figuratively (and literally), the P-value integrated the probability density (under a binomial distribution (10, 0.2)) over the orange shaded area in Fig. 1 (a) .
Formally, statistical hypothesis testing generally begins with a (null) hypothesis and ends with comparing the P-value with a pre-determined significance level to make a decision. There are other types of hypothesis tests; we restrict ourselves here to the standard hypothesis test defined as follows. A null hypothesis ℋ ! : ~ ( ) contains a statement where the data (e.g., the disease statuses of the ten selected individuals) are drawn from a underlying distribution denoted by a function (e.g., ( , ! )). A statistic ( ) is chosen to investigate how much the null hypothesis is supported by the observed data: a large value of indicates there is small evidence (from the data) supporting the null. The P-value of a sample , or ( ), is thus defined as the supremum probability of a test statistic being greater than a critical value under the null hypothesis, namely,
where &'( are the observed data, bold indicates that the data could be multiple-dimensional, and Θ ! is the space for the set of parameters of the null hypothesis (e.g., the hypothesized prevalence ! ). In the above example, the P-value would be = ℙ( ( ) ≥ 0.2 | ~ ( , ! )) = ∑ A 10 B (0.1) " (0.9) %!," ≈ 0.26.
By definition, the P-value quantifies, if the null hypothesis were true, the largest probability of extreme cases happening. Said in a different way, the P-value does not give the probability that the null hypothesis is false; rather, it gives the probability of obtaining data at least as extreme as those observed, if the null hypothesis were true.
In the above example, if the P-value is larger than a pre-determined significance level (e.g., = 0.05), that means there is a more than a tolerable chance of having a prevalence of less than ! under the null hypothesis -the sample thus fails to reject the null. If the P-value is smaller than , we say that the observed prevalence can only happen with small probability if the null were true -the sample evidence thus supports rejecting the null. 
Terminology
Abbreviation Definition
0.05
A significance level (see Type I error below) arbitrarily coined by R. A. Fisher partly for convenience. "The value for which P = .05, or 1 in 20, is 1.96 or nearly 2 (standard deviations from the center of a normal distribution; our insertion); it is convenient to take this point as a limit in judging whether a deviation is to be considered significant or not. Deviations exceeding twice the standard deviation are thus formally regarded as significant" [30] .
0.005
An popular alternative for the significance level [20, 21] .
Alternative hypothesis %
A statement that is complementary to the null hypothesis that there is likely something (scientifically interesting) happening.
Base rate fallacy
Equating sample evidence given by the P-value to the likelihood of an alternative hypothesis being true (e.g., a drug being effective).
Bayes factor
or %& It compares how likely the data is generated from hypothesized model 1 ( ! ) as compared to hypothesized model 2 ( " ); and hence the larger the , the stronger evidence the data supports ! over " .
Bayesian evidence
The posterior probability of # given data .
Causal inference
The study of the existence and strength of directed connection between a cause (e.g., a drug) and an effect (e.g., alleviated disease symptoms).
Critical value of the test
Testcrit, or
CVtest
The (critical) point for deciding between hypotheses (see the point at which blue and red shades divide in Fig. 1 (d) ).
Effect size
A measure that is used to quantify the magnitude of a property of interest, such as the regression coefficient, or the correlation coefficient. It is usually accompanied by a P-value, suggesting its statistical significance.
Evidence-based data analysis
The application of scientific method to the practice of data analysis by performing empirical studies to identify statistical methods, analysis protocols, and software that leads to increased replicability and reproducibility in the hands of users with basic knowledge [27] . 
Fisher's test

Hypothesis test
A hypothesis test is a statistical test that inquiries into the data obtained from a sample of a population, via a statistical framework, so as to make inference about (unknown)
properties of the population. deciding whether to reject the main hypothesis or not.
Neyman
Null hypothesis '
A statement or default hypothesis that there is nothing (scientifically interesting)
happening (e.g., two treatments have equal efficacy in a (two-sided) superiority trial), or the discovery is not as interesting as expected (e.g., the experimental treatment is worse than (i.e., inferior to) the control treatment in a non-inferiority trial). 
Null
P-hacking
Manipulating statistical methods to find a P-value that is significant or conducting several statistical tests and only reporting those that are significant. Also known as data snooping, data dredging, or data fishing.
Power
−
It quantifies the true positive rate. In other words, given that the alternative hypothesis was true, what is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis.
P-value P
The P-value of a sample is the supremum probability of a test statistic being greater than a critical value under the null hypothesis.
Sample size
N
The number of observations or replicates in a sample selected from a population.
Test statistic for the research
RVtest
A number calculated from the sample (such as the sample mean), which can be compared with CVtest to determine the P-value. See statistics T(x) in Equation (1).
Transposed conditional fallacy
Interpreting the P-value as posterior probability ( # | ).
True negative
−
It quantifies the probability of failing to reject the null hypothesis were it true.
Type I error (Significance level)
It quantifies the false positive rate. In other words, given that the null hypothesis was true, what is the probability of observing extreme values. It is typically set at a predetermined value (say 0.1, 0.05, or 0.005).
Type II error
It quantifies the false negative rate. Given that the alternative hypothesis was true, what is the probability of failing to reject the null hypothesis.
Journey to hypothesis testing
"Throughout the 19th century, testing was carried out rather informally without a prespecified rejection level. It was roughly equivalent to calculating an (approximate) p value and rejecting the hypothesis if this value appeared to be sufficiently small" [31] . The formalization of the P-value and the introduction of the significance level came during the early 20 th century, by a pair of great rivals, Karl Pearson (after whom Pearson correlation was named) and Ronald Fisher (the father of modern statistics). Pearson calculated the P-value (which he denoted as capital P) by integration from a chi-square distribution during a chi-squared test [32] . Fisher coined 0.05 as "the significance level" in his book entitled Statistical methods for research workers [30] and used the term P-value in many of his own studies. Regarding setting the significance level at 0.05, Fisher stated that "the (critical) value for which P = .05, or 1 in 20, is 1.96 or nearly 2 (standard deviations); it is convenient to take this point as a limit in judging whether a deviation is to be considered significant or not. Deviations exceeding twice the standard deviation (under a standard normal distribution defined on % ) are thus formally regarded as significant." To better understand P-value-based decision making, it is beneficial to distinguish three types of hypothesis-tests: The Fisher test, the Neyman-Pearson test, and the null hypothesis significance test, from which the P-value is generally derived. We will sail into the sea of Bayesian evidence in a later section; readers interested in statistical decision theory can also refer to Wald's decision functions [38] . Fisher setting up the null hypothesis; (F3) calculating the P-value; (F4) assessing statistical significance; (F5) interpreting the results [30, 33, [40] [41] [42] . The NP test consists of the following steps: (NP1) Setting up the expected effect size; (NP2) selecting an optimal test; (NP3) setting up the main hypothesis (similar to Fisher's null hypothesis); (NP4) setting up the alternative (research) hypothesis (this is a major difference from the Fisher's test); (NP5) calculating the sample size required for good power (this is another major difference from the Fisher's test); (NP6) calculating the critical value (see Table 1 ) for the test; (NP7) calculating the test-statistic for the research; (NP8) deciding whether to reject the main hypothesis or not [33, 39, 43] . The null hypothesis significance test (NHST), first coined by Everett Lindquist [44] , is a hybrid of the two tests: it follows the NP test procedurally and Fisher philosophically [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] . It is the main practice of hypothesis testing in scientific explorations today, including biological studies [45] , education [46] , psychology [47, 48] , social sciences [49] , and has been adopted by textbook writers, journal editors, and publishers [37, 47] , with which we build our discussion (see Fig. 2 
Fig. 2. A comparison between the Fisher's hypothesis test and the Newman-Pearson test, and how they constitute the null hypothesis significance test (NHST
).
A helpful way to understand the logic flows of the P-value based hypothesis tests and decision-making is to view it from the point of the three-world system (i.e., the physical world, the Platonic mathematical world, and the mental world) described by Roger Penrose in The Road to Reality. In our slight modification of it, the physical world represents the entire universe (from chemical compounds to human populations) and contains properties that are not readily accessible (e.g., the prevalence of a disease in the entire world). Yet, these properties can be described using mathematical principles (left arrow in Fig. 1 a) [50] . The mathematical principles can be understood by mental faculty (right arrow in Fig. 1 a) and form one's perspective about the physical world (bottom arrow in Fig. 1 a) . In the triad system (which links population, sample, and the P-value, as illustrated in Fig. 1 b) , a population (e.g., a group of individuals) contains some unknown property (e.g., the prevalence of a disease in a large population), which is governed by some mathematical principle but is difficult to outline explicitly (as one cannot assess every individual in a population). One way to circumvent this is to first simplify the problem as a hypothetical statement about the property (for example, that the prevalence is 20%) and then draw a sample from the population and test, using a statistical model, whether there is evidence from the sample supporting the hypothesis (left arrow in Fig. 1 b) . The test produces a P-value (right arrow in Fig. 1 b) , with which one assigns a probabilistic belief about the population (bottom arrow in Fig. 1 b) and from which one concludes whether to reject the hypothesis.
Although convenient to extract knowledge about the unknown world in mathematical and logical formulations, and to make inference about the world using inductive reasoning, these systems are however not without flaws. In the three-world system, (a) there may be "physical action beyond the scope of mathematical control", (b) there exist "true mathematical assertions whose truth is in principle inaccessible to reason and insight"; and, thus, (c) the mental understanding about the physical world via mathematical formulations may be inconsistent with the truth from the physical world. In the triad of population, sample, and the P-value, (i) it may be possible that the sample property does not well represent the population property; (ii) the unknown property of the population may not be well established using a statistical argument (e.g., a test done on a sample whose distribution violates the assumption of the test); and, thus, (iii) the Pvalue and the belief attached to it (to make any statement about the population property) via a hypothesis test may be inconsistent with the true (but unknown) population property.
The Roles of the P-value in Scientific Enquires
In its three-century long history, the P-value has been of great interest to statisticians, biological and medical scientists, clinicians, and philosophers. There are certainly criticisms, as extreme as "… it does not tell us what we want to know, and we so much want to know what we want to know that, out of desperation, we nevertheless believe that it does" [15] . We will discuss the limitations of the P-value in the next section. Here, we will look at the roles of the P-value.
Chief to decision making, hypothesis testing and P-values form an information extraction system that derives evidence from a sample that may throw probable light on the population at a continuous scale (see 1 and 2 below); additionally, when multiple studies are used to address a common question, they configurate an information pooling system that compares and combines evidence obtained from multiple datasets (see 3 below).
Fig. 3. A roadmap of key usefulness of P-value discussed in this paper. From left to right:
(1) It underpins a clear decision-making system that is convenient to and accepted by a broad scientific, clinic, and medical communities. (2) It provides a common, and simple rule that guides multiple experimenters to evaluate and compare individual findings based on respective P-values and a pre-agreed significance level.
(3) It evaluates the outcomes of a test on a continuous scale. (4) It helps integrating results from multiple studies and datasets. (5) It facilitates causal enquires and provides a metric to evaluate and determine the existence and strength of potential causation that can be used during estimation of causal effect, crossvalidation (including out-of-sample testing), graphical causal reasoning, cause alteration, and the method of instrumental variables (see next section and Fig. 4 for more details).
Among those who have thought about and commented on the usefulness of the P-value are some of the towering geniuses of statistical sciences -Peter Bickel, Roger Berger, George Casella, Kjell Doksum, Larry Hedges, Ingram Olkin, Richard Oosterhoff, and Willem van Zwet -to name only a few. In their writings, there seems to be an agreement that the P-value makes the interpretation of evidence more convenient, ties the knots between results from different studies and data sets, and makes discoveries from various studies comparable to one another (also see Fig.  3 ). More specifically:
1.
"Different individuals faced with the same testing problem may have different criteria of size (see effect size in Table 1 , our insertion). Experimenter I may be satisfied to reject the hypothesis H using a test with size 0.05, whereas experimenter II insists on using 0.01. It is then possible that experimenter I rejects H, whereas experimenter II accepts H on the basis of the Can we agree on a common rule ?
same outcome of an experiment. If the two experimenters can agree on a common test statistic, this difficulty may be overcome by reporting the outcome of the experiment in terms of the Pvalue." (see [51] , p. 221).
2.
"… the smaller the P-value, the stronger the evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis. Hence, a P-value reports the results of a test on a more continuous scale, rather than just the dichotomous decision 'Accept the null hypothesis' or 'Reject the null hypothesis'" (See [52] , p 397).
3.
When different experiments produce various types of data, the P-value can combine the evidence relating to a given hypothesis [53] . This is the basis for 'data fusion' and metaanalysis [54] (see below for further discussion).
To summarize, the P-value makes three important contributions to scientific studies. They are: (1) comparing and bridging decision-making outcomes regarding the same testing problem done on different studies and datasets; (2) supporting evidence at a continuous scale (rather than binary conclusions); and (3) integrating results from multiple studies and datasets.
The P-value in Causal Inference
Aristotle said, "We do not have knowledge of a thing until we have grasped its why; that is to say, its cause." A central contribution hypothesis testing and the P-value make to scientific studies is that they facilitate causal enquiries about the relationship between variables of scientific interest in space, time, between groups, and across individuals.
We begin by summarizing the contributions the P-value makes to causal studies in five areas: estimation of causal effect, cross-validation (including out-of-sample testing), graphical causal reasoning, cause alteration, and the method of instrumental variables (IV).
The applications of causal inference may differ from one subject to another, but the general roles of the P-value enumerated above suggest that there is a common theme in hypothesis testing which one can glimpse into by focusing on one subject. We choose to give examples in brain studies below, about which we know slightly more; we do not imply that, over and above these rules, there are no additional contributions the P-value can make to causal inference in other subjects, such as clinical trials. But if there are, it would be tremendously difficult to list every departure or derivative of it. We hope that our discussion below may stir further enquiries and that our ever-increasing knowledge in statistical and biological sciences will one day allow us to formulate more general and comprehensive rules of the P-value in causal studies. is unavailable, one can consider the method of IV. In the figure, one is interested in studying whether head injury causes risky behaviour. On the one hand, randomization or assigning head injury is impossible; on the other hand, it could be argued that a reverse causation, where risky behaviour causes head injury, is also possible. By using an IV, wearing a helmet, one can then study whether head injury causes risky behaviour. Suppose one assumes that wearing a helmet is unlikely to cause risky behaviour (In the long term or something, obviously will on the dat), and it is likely to reduce head injury. Then, if introducing wearing helmets reduces risky behaviour (while all other variables such as age and gender are controlled for), then it suggests that wearing helmets reduces head injury, which reduces risky behaviour.
The first P-value based causal enquiry is the estimation of causal effect (see Fig. 4 (a) ). Suppose that a researcher is interested in studying whether a Levodopa-based drug is effective in treating Parkinson's disease (PD). Critically, they need to compare the symptoms of a PD patient after taking the drug to that of the same (our emphasis) patient after not taking the drug. Only one of the two is observable (namely a subject S is either going to take a drug or a placebo but not both) and within-subject designs are not suitable due to carry-over effects (in other words, although it is possible that subject S takes both drug and a placebo, the causal argument may be weakened if there were an (carry-over) effect from the former to the latter. A special case of randomization is a matched pair study where two groups, a treatment group and a placebo group are randomized to receive either a medication or a placebo [55] . Using randomization (when randomization is not available, see Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 1 ), the Neyman-Rubin causal model (also known as the potential outcomes framework) shows that the average causal effect can be identified and estimated using the difference between the expected outcome of treatment group and the expected outcome of the control group (note that without randomization, one cannot derive causal properties from two groups consisting of different individuals) [56] [57] [58] . By evaluating the P-value, a hypothesis test can then examine whether, and, if so, to what extent, the drug effect from the treatment group is more significant than that of the control group.
The second P-value based causal enquiry is out-of-sample testing. In other words, the Pvalue is useful to verify whether evidence (e.g., hypothesis testing conclusions and model performance) discovered in a (training) sample can be extrapolated in another (testing) sample (see Fig. 4 (b) ). For example, if one is interested in developing a model to select neural markers that can predict the severity of a brain disease (say Parkinson's disease), one can first fit the model on brain data obtained from a training sample (for example, using brain data of 70 people from an entire set of 100 people) -this is called model development. Subsequently, one can test the parameters of the trained model (for example, the weights of selected neural markers) on the remaining data (i.e., brain data from the remaining 30 subjects) to check whether the markers can predict the severity of Parkinson's disease in new subjects, without further modelling [59] . The efficacy of the selected neural markers can be evaluated by comparing how well the predictions are made using a distance measure (e.g., Pearson correlation) and its P-value. If significant, one can say that the model fitted on the training set is reproducible with regards to the test set. Additionally, the P-value can be used to test whether model trained (and results obtained) from one study (including within-study training and testing) can be extrapolated to (and reproduced in) another dataset or study [60, 61] 
The third P-value based causal enquiry is graphical causal reasoning 3 . It uses graphical models to study how activities from brain region A may be causing those from region B (see Fig.  4 (c)) [62] [63] [64] . The P-value comes firmly in the graphical pursuit; it can be used to evaluate whether a significant link (called a directed edge) exists from A to B (or from B to A) by judging whether the edge strength is significantly different from zero using hypothesis testing 4 . estimate the effect of taking the drug on reducing PD symptoms by comparing the PD symptoms of an individual at 50 who had taken the drug with his or her PD symptoms at 50 had he or she not taken the drug. To solve these issues, Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimates the treatment effect by comparing the outcomes of the subjects under treatment (e.g., taking the drug) with those of a different set of "matched" subjects without treatment (e.g., having not taken the drug) [103] [104] [105] [106] . More concretely, one could first compute the propensity score of A taking the drug based on his or her gender, economic, social, genetic, and demographic backgrounds, and choose an individual from a group of 50-year-old who had not taken the drug but has a propensity score (of taking the drug during his or her younger years) closest to A's. Then we can compare the PD symptoms between these two individuals and estimate the effect of taking the drug on reducing PD symptoms at age 50.
The fourth P-value based causal enquiry is causal alteration. It examines if a modification of a hypothesised cause (while fixing other potential causes unaltered) results in a change of the hypothesised effect (see Fig. 4 (d) ). For example, via transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), one can use a magnetic field generator (or coil) to generate electric current, which modifies the magnetic field of a specific group of neurons in a small surface region of the brain [65, 66] . When confounds are controlled, a hypothesis test can be performed to examine whether there is a significant difference between the outcomes (human behaviour or brain patterns of a region into which these neurons feed) when these neurons are "on" with the outcomes when they are "off", and conclude based on the P-value whether these neurons are responsible for the outcome change.
When a direct manipulation of the cause is impractical, the method of instrumental variable (IV) 5 , the fifth P-value based causal enquiry, may be useful (see Fig. 4 (e)) [67] . For example, head injury for rugby players may cause behaviour, emotion, and sensory changes (such as developing risky behaviour, becoming irritable and angry, and having trouble with balance). A significant correlation between the severity of head injuries and changes in behavior, emotion, and sensation, however, does not suggest the former causes the latter. On the contrary, having risky behaviour and being irritable and angry may result in fights between players whereas having a poor sense of balance may cause falling, both of which may result in head injuries. Furthermore, head injury may first affect another variable, such as the development of depression, which then affect the behavioral, emotion, and sensory changes. One certainly cannot randomize individuals to receive a head injury or not, but could relatively easily introduce an additional variable, socalled instrumental variable (or IV), which affects the chance of having a head injury, but has no independent effect on the outcome (i.e., the behavioral, emotion, and sensory changes). An IV here is wearing helmets (in Rugby Union, players usually do not wear helmets), which is mostly likely to reduce the change of having a head injury but does not directly affect the outcomes. If, after introducing the helmet, the behavioral, emotion, and sensory changes become insignificant, one can conclude with more confidence that head injuries are the cause for changes. The P-value is essential in evaluating the effect size, strength, and order of causal effect regarding the IV and the effect.
The Paradoxes and Misuses of the P-value
The employment of the P-value and significance value in decision-making has never ceased to receive criticisms. Ten critics may, however, offer twenty different reasons why the P-value should be replaced or banned. There are nevertheless some common paradoxes, misuses, and misinterpretations that run through the history of the P-value, from its earliest days to the present time.
Statistical, biological, clinical, and medical scientists conducting hypothesis tests hope to learn knowledge from a sample (of size N) of data to infer (by comparing the P-value and the significance level ) about properties of the population (see Fig. 1 ). Although protective devices (such as randomized sampling, and large sample theory) can reduce the odds of making errors, different sample sizes, P-values, and significance levels may challenge the consistency in decisions across studies. Although we have demonstrated how P-values facilitate scientific C that is the true cause. The P-value is nevertheless useful to assist unveiling potential causal relationships, which can be further improved by conducting additionally analyse. enquires and causal analysis (see Figs. 3 and 4 ), its roles would be optimized if one can clarify its association with sample sizes and significance level with regards to decision-making. The first half of this section inquires into the relationships between three chief properties, the -value, sample size, and significance level, in hypothesis testing and decision-making, and highlights that the interpretation of P-values is contextual while conducting hypothesis testing. Next, we highlight the misuses and misinterpretations of P-value in scientific studies and offer our modest recommendations to avoid them. We hope that our summary and suggestions, by no means exhaustive, may improve the application of the P-value and engender consistent and reproducible scientific discoveries.
The Paradoxes of the P-value
Recall the example earlier where a clinician wanted to test whether the prevalence of a disorder was 10%. To do so, the clinician selected a sample of ten individuals, found two out the ten had the disease, and used evidence from the sample (20% sample incident rate) to make inference about the population prevalence. With P = 0.26, the hypothesis was not rejected.
The first paradox is that a larger sample size yields a smaller P-value; decisions made one the same effect size may therefore be inconsistent. For example, suppose we increased the sample size from 10 to 50, of which 10 had the disorder (so the sample incident rate remained at 20%). This yielded a P-value of 0.02. Although the new sample had the same (20%) incident rate, the null hypothesis was rejected under a significance level of 0.05 with a larger sample. This test, however, would still survive under a significance level of 0.005 (as recommended by [20, 21] ). Now consider an even larger sample of 100, of which 20 had the disease (again the sample incident rate was 20%), the P-value was now 0.002, and the hypothesis, even with the more stringent significance level of 0.005, was rejected.
Generally, as we see from Fig. 5 , the P-value decreases monotonically as the sample size increases. Thus, a hypothetically aggressive scientist may attempt to "hack" the P-value by adding more subjects to the study or repeating significance tests (not for better science but for a smaller P). It is thus preferable to consider both sample size and effect size during experimental plans. For example, in clinical trials, a Phase II study is first done to determine an effect size, and this information is then used to design a Phase III study with a sample large enough to confirm the observations from the phase II study. Indeed, most clinicians prefer clinical trials with very large sample sizes, as they feel larger sample studies are more reliable than smaller trials; with a large sample size, one can then look at the effect size and try to decide if this is good news for patients or not. Thus, first, we do not object lowering the significance level (for example, to 0.005), as it may help reduce the rate of falsely significant discoveries [21] . For example, while most clinicians will be confronted with clinical trials where one clear primary outcome is defined, in genome-wide association studies (GWAS), the standard threshold has been set much lower than 0.005 ( < 5 × 10 ,/ ) to control for the number of false-positive associations [68, 69] . Second, we do not advocate against large-sample studies (which have many advantages as we see below); rather, we argue that one should treat the P-value contextually and avoid being that aggressive scientist (see suggested guidelines in Table 2 and Figure 6 ).
Fig. 5. The paradoxes of the P-value. (a)
The associations between P-value, the sample size, and the significance level. The figure shows that the P-value goes down as the sample sizes increases in the binomial experiment given in the text. The paradox lies in that, given a particular significance level (say 0.05), one can increase the size of sample to obtain a P-value that is significant. (b) Even if the significance level is lowered (to, say, 0.005), one could keep increasing the sample size to obtain a significant P-value compared to the new significance level. On the other hand, with fixed sample size, one may adjust the significance level to "control" whether the result is significant or not. (c) The paradox between the P-value, the sample size, and statistical power. A larger sample size may yield a more significant P-value with a small effect size, but it also increases power. (d) Meanwhile, reducing the significance level (say from 0.05 to 0.005) may produce more conservative testing results, but it reduces power. Figs. (a)-(d) give demonstrations, from two different perspectives, why the interpretation of the P-value needs to be contextual.
The second paradox arises because of the relationship between sample-size, the P-value, and power. Statistical power quantifies the true positive rate, which equals to one minus the type II error (or 1 − ) (see Fig. 1 c) . In other words, the power measures the ability of a hypothesis test to reject the null hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis is true. To see the paradox, let's return to the binomial example. Although a hypothetically aggressive scientist can always "hack" a hypothesis test by adding more subjects to the study however stringent a significance level is, it would be premature to say that collecting data from a large set of sample data is a bad practice, as a larger sample size provides more statistical power. More concretely, consider a null hypothesis where the prevalence of the disease is 10% against an alternative hypothesis where the prevalence is 20%. Under the same significance level (say at 0.05), the type II error decreases as sample size goes up; as a result, the power increases. On the other hand, an enquiry into the relationship between the significance level and the power shows that a stringent significance level is not always . 5 (d) , a test with a more stringent significance level yields less power, and this is true for every sample size. Taken together, although the incidences in three samples ( = 10, 50, and 100) were the same, namely 20%, the hypothesis testing results were different. In other words, for each (lower) significance level, when the sample incidence rate was relatively stable, it was possible to obtain a significant P-value by increasing the sample size, thereby "hacking" the test.
Thus, on the one hand, the interpretation of a P-value needs to be contextual. On the other hand, when designing experiments and conducting hypothesis testing, there is a compromise to make, one that considers balancing the sample size, significance level, and power.
To summarize, these two examples demonstrate that:
(i) The P-value based hypothesis testing is sample-size dependent.
(ii) Lowering the threshold alone may make rejecting a null hypothesis more difficult, but one may increase the sample size to "hack" the P-value.
(iii) A larger sample size may yield a more significant (but not meaningful in certain context) P-value, but it also increases power. Meanwhile, reducing the significance level (say from 0.05 to 0.005) may produce more conservative testing results, but reduces power.
(iv) The interpretation of the P-value needs to be contextual, accounting for not only the scientific problem in question but also the experimental design and the sample size, significance level, and the desired power.
The P-value and Multidimensional Data: A Love-hate Relationship
Anyone performing data analysis today cannot fail to be impressed by the size of the data. Containing a wealth of information, large-scale data provide a bigger platform to make scientific enquiries, and, properly treated, may produce more consistent conclusions [70] . We have discussed above how a large sample size may lower the P-value, and how it could increase power; there are a few additional issues that arise with large-scale data.
First, "big data" may introduce "big errors". Large-scale data such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) data are contaminated with noise. For example, in fMRI data, multiples sources of noise can corrupt the true signals, such as scanner-related noise including thermal noise and scanner instability noise, noise due to head motion and physiology, HRF model errors, and noise due to different sites [70] . It is thus necessary to reduce the amount of noise and to extract meaningful (e.g., with high signal-to-noise ratio) information from the data prior to hypothesis testing. Practically, although a geneticist with a plausible hypothesis about the involvement of a gene in a certain disease may still be in favour of a standard significance level, geneticists who consider a massive number of comparisons have begun to require replication of study findings via cross-site and cross-study platforms (see also meta-analysis below) and impose very strict significance level ( < 5 × 10 ,/ ) [68, 69] . Even with extensive replication and very strong signals, however, one may still observe false discoveries due to confounding variables or other biases from large-scale studies [71] . Therefore, while continuing to design more stringent test pipelines (such as in Fig. 6) , integrating, and reproducing evidences, it is important to improve critical statistical thinking, teaching, and interdisciplinary training [26] .
The other problem with large-scale data is the increasing occurrence of spurious findings. Consider a hypothesis testing to investigate the relationships between functional connectivity of 500 brain regions of interest (ROI) and individual creativity. 500 edges (where an edge indicates the correlation between signals obtained from two regions) are obtained from 100 individuals. Simultaneously, a creativity score is obtained from each individual, yielding 100 scores measuring the overall creativity. Due to the large dimensionality of the regions, it is very likely that a few irrelevant edges are spuriously associated with the 100 creativity scores [72] . This may introduce an erroneous scientific discovery that brain regions associated with these edges are the biological underpinnings for creativity, and multiple hypotheses need to be accounted for when interpreting the associated P-values.
The third problem derives from the relationship between a small effect size with a significant P-value. "In psychological and sociological investigations involving very large numbers of subjects, it is regularly found that almost all correlations or differences between means are statistically significant" [73] . Empirically, high-dimensional data with a large sample size may yield an effect size that is extremely small but accompanied by a significant P-value. For example, correlation of 0.1 in a sample of 500 has a P-value around 0.025; a correlation of 0.01 in a sample of 100,000 has a P-value around 0.002. Despite being significant (the former being significant compared to 0.05 and the latter significant compare to 0.005), the P-values in these cases may offer little inference. In clinical trials and pathological studies, a small but significant effect size may not only offer little clinical inference, but also be difficult to interpret and reproduce [74] .
The Misuses of the P-value and Potential Remedies
One way to look at the P-value based hypothesis testing is that it is a decision-making mechanism through which one studies a sample, obtains a probability, and assigns (subjective) belief to make (inductive) inference about an unobserved population under a pre-determined significance level. Such a mechanism has simplified decision-making and advanced biological, clinic, medical, and statistical research since its beginning and is increasingly protected by advanced measures; it is however not invulnerable to misuses.
We have given above a few examples to highlight the importance that the interpretation of the P-value should be contextual. In the following, we will summarize some common confusions, misinterpretations, and misuses of the P-value. To begin, let us ask ourselves the following questions:
Must scientific conclusions be solely based on whether a P-value is less than a specific threshold? Are all post hoc scientific interpretation based on the P-value justified? (ii) How could we prevent "P-hacking", for example, conducting several statistical tests and only report those that pass the threshold, or add subjects to existing studies to lower the P-value, in scientific discoveries? (iii) Many studies report results when observing a P-value smaller than 0.05 (or 0.005). But is 0.05 (or 0.005) an optimal benchmark? (iv) Does the P-value measure the probability that the research hypothesis is true? Or does P-value measure the probability that observed data is due to chance? (v)
In the era of big data, does obtaining a very small P-value from hypothesis testing using a very large sample provide conclusive evidence about the result being significant? (vi)
Last but not the least, must scientific discovery always be accompanied by hypothesis testing (and the P-value)? Are there alternative statistical approaches?
In Table 2 , we attempt to answer these questions and present our modest recommendations, cautiously recognizing that it is difficult to offer complete remedies or definitive suggestions regarding a probabilistic, and contextual, system. Subsequently, we present a flowchart in Fig. 6 as an example of how to make better use of the P-value in hypothesis testing based scientific discoveries.
Misuses and misconceptions of the P-value Recommendations
i. Scientific conclusions decisions are based only on whether a P-value is less than a specific threshold.
Observing that a P-value is less than a threshold (e.g., 0. ii. "P-hacking" (e.g., conducting several statistical tests, and only report those that pass the threshold).
Instead of "hacking" the P, (re)evaluate whether the experimental design is appropriate (e.g., is the design balanced? Is the sampling randomized?), if data collection is appropriate, the data processing is rigorous, the model is suitable, and all assumptions are met. If different experiments produce various types of data, conduct meta-analysis and use the P-value to combine evidence relating to a given hypothesis [54] . Finally, if multiple statistical tests are conducted on the same data, report all analyses and their P-values.
iii. 0.05 is the benchmark for significance level.
We cannot offer strong recommendation for a benchmark of a significance level. The number 0.05 is coined by Fisher for convenience 6 (but see a recent call to use 0.005 [20, 21] ). In general, when data is too small to be split into a training set and a test set, use a conservative significance level for confirmative discovery (e.g., 0.05 is more conservative than 0.1). Whenever possible, replicate the result in a novel sample. For large data that can be split into a training set and a test set, consider a conservative significance level (e.g., 0.005)
for training, and a relatively more liberal one (e.g., 0.05) for out-ofsample prediction. studies, and are likely to be irreproducible [74] . When facing large sample sizes, data-driven approaches could be used instead (see vi below). If, however, a small but significant effect size is reproducible, the finding may still shed light on basic science, but it needs to be contextual (see i above). In biomedical studies, this would be indicated by a statistical statement, for example, "the difference was statistically significant", and then an additional statement made on the clinical significance, using the effect size.
vi. Scientific discovery must be accompanied by hypothesis testing (and
P-value).
There are alternative approaches. Depending on the specific scientific question, they are sometimes more suitable and feasible than hypothesis testing. For example, if scientists are more interested in estimating a parameter (e.g., mean activation) rather than testing a parameter (e.g., whether mean activation is different from zero), they can use confidence, credibility, or prediction intervals. If scientists have some prior knowledge about the problem, they could consider Bayesian methods. There are also alternative measures of evidence, such as likelihood ratio or Bayes Factor (see below). Finally, one could consider models based on decision theory and false discovery rates. [12, 20, 21, 59, 75, 76] Making Better Use of the P: An Improved P(aradigm) Because of the paradoxes of P-values, it may be difficult at present to suggest a sample size, significance level, or power that would yield universal assent. We therefore instead suggest a procedure for conducting hypothesis testing aimed at improving reproducibility in scientific studies (see a pipeline in Fig. 6 ). We restrict our recommendation to studies that conduct (null) statistical hypothesis tests. We do not claim nor advocate that this is the only way to perform will still escape notice if the data are insufficiently numerous to bring them out, but no lowering of the standard of significance would meet this difficulty." (see p 44 [30] ).
Table 2. Common misinterpretation and misuse of P-values in science and recommendations
statistical data analysis. Rather, the pipeline serves as an example where rigorous statistical thinking and analysis may reduce confounding effects, avoid over-fitting, and render reproducible research. We highlight that experimental design, data processing, and scientific interpretation are equally important, but are not shown in the figure or discussed in detail, as they are not the main focus of the article.
We take a correlation test between two random variables (e.g., the edge strength between two brain regions over time) as an example. But the flowchart in Fig. 6 (b) can extend to other models or tests, for example, a test of a regression coefficient in a linear regression analysis. It can also extend to cases involving more than two variables.
Together, we reiterate that the interpretation of the P-value is contextual. George Box said "Remember that all models are wrong; the practical question is how wrong do they have to be to not be useful" 7 [77] . We need to interpret the P-value along with, but never independent of, the research (experimental) design, hypothesis, the model and its assumptions, and prior evidence. That it is contextual does not imply it is not rigorous. As shown in Fig. 6 , even a seemingly simple correlation analysis requires extra caution to demonstrate (promising) causality. Improving statistical thinking and interdisciplinary training integrates statistical concepts and biological evidences, therefore, are equally important, critical, and urgent [26] . 7 Also known as "All models are wrong, but some are useful". Note that the correlation test is used as an example; it could be replaced with other models or tests. It extends to cases where more than two variables are concerned. For the purpose of demonstration, we focus mainly on testing linear causation, and abbreviate the procedure for testing non-linear causation (which is marked with two parallel bars in the figure) -interested readers can refer to [78, 79] . We do not claim nor advocate that this is the only procedure to analyse data; rather, it serves as an example to remove confounding effects, avoid over-fitting, and conduct reproducible research. We emphasize that a careful experimental design, appropriate data processing, and contextual scientific interpretation are equally important, but are not shown in the figure. The illustration demonstrates that even simple analysis needs additional caution when causal inference and reproducibility are concerned.
Hypothesis Test in the Bayesian Realm
An alternative way to gather evidence is to use the posterior probability of ! given data through the Bayesian lenses [13, 14, [80] [81] [82] [83] [84] [85] . We provide a simple example below for interested readers to distinguish the key difference between the Bayesian posterior evidence and the P-value; others may skip to the section comparing the two approaches.
The Bayesian Posterior Evidence
Suppose one observes data = , where ~ ( − ), and (a) (•) is symmetric about zero; (b) ( − ) has monotone likelihood ratio; (c) there is some prior information (or ( )) for the location parameter . Consider the following hypothesis test: ! : ≤ 0 versus % : > 0.
(
The Bayesian posterior evidence, written as ( ! | ), for (2) . Evidently, ( ! | ) does not necessarily offer equivalent evidence as the Pvalue. Unfortunately, "… most nonspecialists interpret precisely as ( | ) (see [80] ) [thereby committing the fallacy of the transposed conditional, our insertion], which only compounds the problem" [14] .
Bayesian Posterior Evidence vs. the P-value
Naturally, one would ask which is more suitable in scientific studies? A definitive answer is difficult; but it turns out that the Bayesian evidence ( ! | ) and the P-value are not mutually exclusive: there are situations where these two are equivalent and others where the two offer different insights about the null. Thus, it is helpful for a practitioner to distinguish between them when deciding which to choose. Since one-and two-sided hypothesis tests are the predominate practices in scientific and clinic expositions, we will focus on these two types of tests in the following. Readers who are interested in composite hypothesis tests could refer to [81, 82] .
[For a two-sided (point null) test]:
The P-value tends to overstate the evidence against the null [14, 83, 84] ; that is, the P-value is smaller than the Bayesian posterior evidence.
2.a [For a one-sided test]:
The P-value can be approximately equal to the Bayesian posterior evidence [86] . 2.b [For a one-sided test]: One can construct a (improper) prior such that the P-value and the Bayesian posterior evidence match [87]. 3.a [For a one-sided test]: For data following a distribution with monotone likelihood ratio, and that has unimodal density, symmetric about zero, or is normal (0, . ), where 0 < . < ∞, the P-value is equal to inf ( ! | ), where the infimum is take over a class of priors [13] .
3.b [For a one-sided test]
: For other distributions, the P-value is greater than or equal to inf ( ! | ), suggesting that the P-value may be understating the evidence against the null [13] . 4. If prior mass is concentrated at a point (or in a small interval) and the remainder is allowed to vary over the alternative hypothesis % (in other words one has strong prior information), then there could be (noticeable) discrepancy between the Bayesian posterior evidence and the P-value. To see this, recall the hypothesis test in (2) . Suppose there is some prior information about the location parameter : ( ) = ! ℎ( ) + (1 − ! ) ( ). This is equivalent to putting a prior ! to = 0 and another (1 − ! ) ( ) to > 0, assigning mass on the point null hypothesis, thereby biasing the prior in favour of ! (for any fixed ) [13] .
Taken together:
For a two-sided test (e.g., testing whether the disease prevalence is above or below 20%), the conclusions made using Bayesian evidence may be more conservative than using the P-value [14, 83, 84] .
For a one-sided test (e.g., testing whether the disease prevalence is above 20%), the two offer approximately the same evidence (and can be constructed to be equivalent) [86, 87] .
When one has strong prior information (say about the null hypothesis), the Bayesian alternative would favour the null [13] . It is particularly attractive, for example, when one conducts region fine mapping to identify the true causal variant(s) [88] .
When samples are large, the small P-values (see discussions above and Fig. 5 ) almost systematically reject the null; the Bayesian alternative does not [89] .
One should be cautiously aware that if different studies adopt different priors, it would be problematic to compare findings between studies [90] .
An Example: The Bayes Factor in Model Comparison
A useful application of Bayesian evidence in scientific studies can be found in model comparison.
For example, an epidemiologist is interested in investigating whether the data suggest that the disease incident rate is at 20% ( % ), or at 10% ( . ). More concretely, suppose % and . are two hypothesized models parameterized by % and . , respectively. The Bayes factor (see [89] for a comprehensive review), or K, is written as: 
where stands for the data, and % and . are two hypothesized models. Note that when the priors ( % ) and ( . ) are equal, the Bayes factor reduces to = :(< " |$)
:(< , |$) , thus degenerating to a likelihood ratio test.
In words, the Bayes factor, by the above formulation, compares how likely the data is generated from model 1 ( % ) as compared to model 2 ( . ); hence the larger the , the stronger evidence the data supports % over . . To see it more concretely, suppose an epidemiologist wanted to test the prevalence of a certain type of disorder. The epidemiologist came up with six candidate models ( % ) to test against an alternative model which assumed the prevalence was at 10% (namely . considered a parameter . = 0.10). The six candidate models considered their parameters as follows, (1) a uniform distribution or % ~ [0,1]; (2) 15%, or % = 0.15; (3) 40%, or % = 0.40; (4) 20%, or % = 0.20 (which is the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE)); a normal distribution or % ~ (0.2, 0.01), which can be considered as the MLE plus a small noise; and (6) a normal distribution or % ~ (0.2, 0.1), which can be considered as the MLE contaminated by a large noise, say, due to sampling error.
The epidemiologist considered a number of samples of sizes 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100, and 200. For comparison, suppose that the true incident rates were all at 20%; namely for each sample, there were, respectively, 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 20, and 40 patients. Using Equation (3), the Bayes factors for each test are calculated and presented in Fig. 7 . & had a parameter & = 0.10. The % whose hypothesized parameter equaled the sample incident yielded the largest Bayes factor. In other words, the maximum likelihood estimator or MLE (in this case 0.2) achieved the optimal Bayes factor. The results also showed that the farther a hypothesized parameter departed from the MLE (e.g., % = 0.40 is farther from 0.2 than % = 0.15), the smaller the Bayes factor (or evidence); this was true no matter of sample size but the larger the sample size, the stronger then evidence. When sample size was small, the model with % ~ (0.2, 0.01) (namely the MLE plus some Gaussian noise (0.2, 0.01) underperformed % = 0.15, indicating the noise had contaminated the evidence. With a larger sample size, the former outperformed the latter, indicating the signals from large-scale data had overcome the noise.
There are four messages we can draw from the simulation studies, from which one could peer into the general behavior of the Bayes factor.
(a) When the hypothesis (in % ) is close to the truth (20%), the Bayes factor uniformly supports % over . (as the Bayes factor is larger than 1 no matter the sample size).
(b) When the hypothesis (in % ) is far from the truth, the Bayes factor uniformly opposes % over . (as the Bayes factor is no larger than 1 no matter the sample size).
(c) The larger the sample size, the stronger evidence Bayes factor provides for supporting (or opposing) % . This is a major difference from the P-value, which uniformly decreases when sample size increases.
(d) The Bayes factor accounts for prior information and uncertainties in the model. For example, when prior information about % is close to the truth (20%), the Bayes factor strongly supports % ; when the prior is contaminated by some noise (as in (0.2, 0.01) and (0.2, 0.1)), the Bayes factor becomes smaller, and the more noise found in the prior the smaller the Bayes factor. When there is uncertainty (as in a uniform distribution), the small sample size would support . (namely . = 0.1); when sample size becomes sufficiently large, the Bayes factor detects from the data that it is increasingly unlikely that the data corresponds to a model ( . ) where . = 0.1.
The Analysis of Analyses: Meta-analysis
Meta-analysis (analysis of analyses 8 ) comes effectively and conveniently in the pursuit of integrating, and extracting evidence obtained from large-scale heterogenous datasets, overcoming reporting bias, and drawing reliable conclusions. By analysing of, and pooling multiple P-values from (see Fig. 3 ) heterogenous studies and datasets, meta-analysis integrates information, improves power, reduces bias of the estimators, and delivers more reproducible evidence (see [54] for a thorough overview of meta-analysis tools and see [91] for a review on meta-analysis in neuroimaging 9 ).
The advantages of using large-scale heterogeneous datasets is scientific studies are twofold: information accumulation and commonality extraction [70] .
Information accumulation means that increasing the size of a dataset and combining different data sets not only expands the dimensionality of the data (in space (such as measuring more sample units), time (such as obtaining more repeated measurements), and sample size (such as increasing the number of subjects)) but also compound heterogeneous sample, disease, or task information, either of which a small-scale dataset or a single dataset may not be able to offer. As a result, P-values obtained from large-scale (or combined) datasets may more clearly highlight the difference between subpopulations (e.g., healthy versus disease, male versus female, individuals under various treatments or stimuli versus controls), and identify the pathological-, gender-, treatment-, and task-specific phenotypes. Repeated measurements on heterogeneous subpopulations can help to further delineate the longitudinal variability of the features, thereby improving disease diagnosis and treatment analysis over time, and paving the way for longitudinal disease prediction and progression monitoring [92] [93] [94] [95] .
Commonality extraction refers to obtaining converging evidence from multiple studies and data sets. On the one hand, data sets obtained from different studies and experimental conditions contain heterogeneous, and meaningful signals (see above). On the other hand, they may be subject to different degrees of systematic bias due to different experimental designs (e.g., a complete factorial design versus a fractional factorial design [96] ), noises (such as head motion [97] ), measurement errors due to data aggregation under different paradigms, from different cites, on different dates, etc. [98] , missing data [99] , and reporting bias (for example, only positive results are reported or published [100] ). Consequently, data analysis results reported from data sets obtained under different designs and conditions may provide different P-values, thereby generating different, sometimes opposite conclusions.
Today, it is increasingly common to see studies considering, and balancing both information accumulation and commonality extraction. For example, a committee of researchers may organize several study groups conducting multiple experiments and gathering data at different locations under various conditions, a good practice that has already been adopted in clinical trials (multicentre studies), to seek for converging evidence that may address a common scientific question. Naturally, one would ask, what is a suitable approach to obtain evidence from aggregated studies and data sets?
Chief to this pursuit is meta-analysis. Specifically, (1) Meta-analysis can integrate results from different studies. For example, Fisher's combined probability test can combine the P-values obtained from multiple studies and datasets (see Fig. 3 ). Additionally, it can combine measurements obtained from different studies and datasets. For example, via meta-analysis, mean activations from the same brain region across multiple studies are weighted according to the inverse variance (inverse variance weighting) -that is, the larger the variance in one study, the smaller the weight is assigned to the mean from that study -and then summed up over all studies.
(2) Meta-analysis can reduce bias. For example, when regions of (prior) interest have more liberally thresholds than others (such as in large-scale neuroimaging studies,), the results are likely biased towards these regions. Seed-based d mapping (also known as the signed differential mapping (SDM)) [101, 102] can meta-analyse functional and structural brain data across multiple large-scale (neuroimaging) studies 10 to reduce bias and improve power. 10 First, peak coordinates (e.g., the brain regions where the differences between healthy and disease are the highest) are combined with t-statistic maps (each t-statistic map can be plotted to the brain space where regions with large t values indicate activation) from studies using SPM; second statistical maps and effect-sizes maps are recreated; finally, individual maps are combined according to intra-study variance (i.e., studies with large sample sizes and/or lower error contribute more) and inter-study heterogeneity (i.e., studies with large variances contribute less).
(3) Meta-analysis can examine whether discoveries are reproducible. Similar to leave-onesubject-out cross-validation, it can perform the so-called leave-one-study-out cross-validation: it first compares the estimate (e.g., mean activation of a brain lesion) from one study, iteratively, to the summarized estimate from the remaining (n-1, where n is the number of total studies) studies, and then judges, via the P-value, whether the conclusion made across the studies are reliable and reproducible.
Conclusion
Hypothesis testing and P-values have been widely used to investigate the associations between genetic, neural, and behavioural features, and to inquire into the efficacy of clinical treatments for diseases and disorders. Despite advances, many have questioned the validity of this testing mechanism, the appropriateness of P-values, and the validity of an arbitrarily determined significance level, for drawing scientific conclusions.
In this review, in light of recent debates, we aimed to provide an overview of key confusions, controversies, and the central role of the P-value that may interest or concern biologists, clinicians, educators, epidemiologist, medical doctors, philosophers, and statisticians. To provide a relatively comprehensive, and balanced review, we first outlined the roles the P-value plays in scientific studies. In brief, the P-value makes the interpretation of evidence more convenient, ties the knots between results from different data sets, and makes discoveries from various studies comparable to one another. Having recognized its contributions and usefulness, we discussed the associations between the P-value, sample size, significance level, and statistical power. Following this, we presented common misuses and misinterpretations of the P-value, accompanied by our modest recommendations. To complement our discussion, we compared the Bayesian posterior evidence with the P-value. Finally, we discuss the advantages of meta-analysis in integrating and extracting evidence from multiple studies and data sets.
The introduction of the P-value since the 18 th century has advanced time and again hypothesis driven scientific discoveries. It underpins a clear decision-making system that is convenient to and accepted by a broad scientific, clinic, and medical communities; it provides a common, and simple rule that guides multiple experimenters to evaluate and compare individual findings based on respective P-values and a pre-agreed significance level; it evaluates the outcomes of a test on a continuous scale; it helps integrating results from multiple studies and datasets; and it facilitates causal enquires and provides a metric to evaluate and determine the existence and strength of potential causation that can be used during estimation of causal effect, cross-validation (including out-of-sample testing), graphical causal reasoning, cause alteration, and the method of instrumental variables. Today, it is being widely used in scientific enquires to test the relationship between group-specific, idiosyncratic, genetic and environmental features, the difference between outcomes from multiple geographical (such as corps from different fields) and biological (such as patterns from different brain areas), how external stimuli and environment factors affect genetic organizations and biological characteristics (such as heart rate and brain signals), how these patterns underpin human behaviors, and how their irregularity may lead to malfunction and illnesses. The P-value will, in our view, continue to play important roles in and advance hypothesis-testing based scientific enquires, whether in its current form or modified formulations; our analyses and examples highlight that its interpretations must be contextual, taking into account the scientific question, experimental design (including the sample size and significance level), statistical power, effect size, and reproducibility of the findings.
With little doubt, there will be a continual effort to find more rational ways to extract knowledge from data and to search for more suitable holistic interpretation for statistical and scientific evidence. As employing hypothesis testing and P-values is and will for the foreseeable future remain one of the standard practices in scientific enquiries, a beginning can be made by improving our understanding of its strength, weakness, usefulness, and misuses. We hope that our discussion here could make some contribution towards this pursuit.
